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The Modal Gap: the Objective Problem of Lessing’s
Ditch(es) and Kierkegaard’s Subjective Reply
Matthew A. Benton
Abstract: This essay expands upon the suggestion that Lessing’s infamous
‘ditch’ is actually three ditches: temporal, metaphysical, and existential gaps.
It examines the complex problems these ditches raise, and then proposes that
Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript exhibit a similar triadic organizational
structure, which may signal a deliberate attempt to engage and respond to Lessing’s three gaps. Viewing the Climacean project in this way offers an enhanced
understanding of the intricacies of Lessing’s rationalist approach to both religion
and historical truth, and illuminates Climacus’s subjective response to Lessing.

That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however earnestly
I have tried to make the leap. If anyone can help me over it, let him do it, I beg
him, I adjure him. He will deserve a divine reward from me.
G. E. Lessing

Introduction
In the vast literature on Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, much is made of the anti-Hegelian pos Gotthold

Lessing, Lessing’s Theological Writings, Henry Chadwick (ed. & tr.) (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, ), . I also cite the recent Cambridge edition:
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Lessing’s Philosophical and Theological Writings, H. B. Nisbet
(ed. & tr.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), . Hereafter I cite both
these editions consecutively, with page references offset by a semi-colon.



ture and the subjective approach to truth. These topics have garnered
most of the attention, and with good reason, since they do figure prominently in the writings of Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Johannes Climacus.
Yet comparatively little has been written on the rejoinders aimed at
G. E. Lessing (–) in the Fragments and Postscript, which attempt
to deal with Lessing’s infamous ‘ugly, broad ditch’ and the associated difficulties posed by historical, philosophical, and religious conceptions of


For an important overview of the standpoints on the relationship between Lessing and Kierkegaard, and some of the pertinent (mostly German) literature, see Claus
V. Bormann ‘Lessing’, in Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulová Thulstrup (eds), Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana: Kierkegaard’s Teachers (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, ),
–, as well as André Kraus, Kierkegaard und Lessing: Soren Aabye Kierkegaards
Rekurs auf Gotthold Ephraim Lessing in den ‘Philosophischen Brocken’ und der ‘Abschließenden unwissenschaftlichen Nachschrift zu den Philosophischen Brocken’ (Hamburg: Verlag
Dr. Kovac, ). The following also include a focus on Lessing and Kierkegaard:
Erik Lunding, ‘Lessing und Kierkegaard’, Orbis Litterarum,  (), –; Jacques
Colette, ‘Kierkegaard et Lessing’, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 
(), –; Sven-Aage Jørgensen, ‘Lessing in Dänemark: Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Grundtvig und Kierkegaard’, in Wilfried Barner and Albert M. Reh (eds), Nation
und Gelehrtenrepublik: Lessing im europäischen Zusammenhang (Detroit/Munich: Wayne
State University Press, ), –; Michelle Stott, Behind the Mask: Kierkegaard’s
Pseudonymic Treatment of Lessing in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Lewisburg PA:
Bucknell University Press, ); Alastair Hannay, ‘Having Lessing on one’s side’, International Kierkegaard Commentary,  (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, ), –
; M. Jamie Ferreira ‘Faith and the Kierkegaardian leap’, in Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, ), –; Jan-Olav Henriksen, The Reconstruction of Religion:
Lessing, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, ); Richard Campbell, ‘Lessing’s problem and Kierkegaard’s answer’, Scottish Journal of Theology,  (),
–; James Whisenant, ‘Kierkegaard’s use of Lessing’, Modern Theology,  (), –
; Gordon E. Michalson, Jr, ‘Lessing, Kierkegaard, and the ‘ugly ditch’: a reexamination’, Journal of Religion,  (), –; idem, ‘Theology, historical knowledge, and
the contingency-necessity distinction’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 
(), –; idem, Lessing’s ‘Ugly Ditch’: A Study of Theology and History (University
Park PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, ); idem, ‘Kierkegaard’s debt to Lessing: response to Whisenant’, Modern Theology,  (), –. Of these, only the
latter three (Campbell, Whisenant, and Michalson) engage in sustained examination of
Lessing’s multifaceted ditch(es) and Kierkegaard’s reply, to which this essay hopes to
contribute. For an excellent work on Lessing himself, see Toshimasa Yasukata, Lessing’s
Philosophy of Religion and the German Enlightenment (New York NY: Oxford University
Press, ).



truth. Kierkegaard’s response to Lessing in the works of Climacus centres on themes that would generate much protracted theological debate in
the modern period: the intersection of reason, history, and revelation, the
relation of reason and faith, and the suitability of historical evidence for
situating theology.
The purpose of this essay is to evaluate such issues pertaining to Lessing in the Fragments and the early part of the Postscript, bringing to the
forefront these background concerns which inform Climacus’s writings. I
aim to show, first, that Lessing’s texts provide a crucial window into the
structure and overall approach of Climacus’s work, and second, that a
reading of Climacus without Lessing in mind results in an impoverished
interpretation of the project, since I will suggest that a sustained argument in response to Lessing underlies Fragments and Postscript. I will
begin with a brief assessment of Lessing’s ‘On the proof of the spirit and
of power’, and, following Gordon Michalson, identify the three discernible
ditches in Lessing’s presentation. I will propose further development of
this thesis by highlighting their significant nuances, and suggest a triadic
structural arrangement. I then analyse Kierkegaard’s reply, which contrasts the objective and subjective issues of Christianity, and also exhibits
a corresponding triadic structure, through which he deals with each ditch.
This analysis will reveal the core of their disagreement and note the important ways in which Kierkegaard reframes the problems in support of
 That

Fragments (as well as Postscript) has to do with Lessing is clear from the fact
that Kierkegaard contemplated the following subtitle to Fragments: ‘The Apologetical
Presuppositions of Christian Dogmatics, or Approximations to Faith. Para.  An Expression of Gratitude to Lessing’. See Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, Howard V.
Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds) (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, ), xvii, and
Supplement, . Kierkegaard integrated this subtitle into the Postscript’s introduction,
and the expression of gratitude to Lessing becomes the subtitle of ch.  of Part . See
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments,  vols, Howard V. Hong and
Edna H. Hong (eds) (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, ),  and . (Unless
otherwise noted, all further citations to Postscript refer to vol. .)
 Note that I am not arguing that Lessing is the primary target of Climacus, nor that
Lessing is at the centre of the project. I am rather presenting the strong case that Lessing
is not merely peripheral.
 Michalson, Lessing’s ‘Ugly Ditch’, , –.



his answers.

Lessing’s ditch(es): the temporal gap
In ‘On the proof and the spirit and of power’, Lessing begins by laying
out the epistemological division between reports of supernatural phenomenon such as miracles and fulfilled prophecy, and their actual occurrence. The temporal distance between himself and the time of Christ
is problematic, since the proof which was enjoyed in the first centuries
of Christianity, the ‘proof of the spirit and of power no longer has any
spirit or power, but has sunk to the level of human testimonies of spirit and
power’. Thus, ‘reports of fulfilled prophecies are not fulfilled prophecies;
that reports of miracles are not miracles’, and finally, that such testimonies
are ‘a medium which takes away all their force’.
One detects an empiricism here similar to that of David Hume, who argues that ‘no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle’ when weighed
against ‘the ultimate standard’ of our ‘experience and observation’ that
such miracles never occur. The empiricist principle of analogy takes over
for the person removed from the scene. It seems unfair then that others
were provided with actual experience of supernatural evidence in support
of Christian truth-claims, yet Lessing is not: ‘How is it to be expected of
me that the same inconceivable truths which sixteen to eighteen hundred
years ago people believed on the strongest inducement, should be believed
by me to be equally valid on an infinitely lesser inducement?’ Thus, Lessing’s complaint is really twofold. First, he protests that with regard to
the events of revelation he is a non-contemporary, one ‘untimely born’.
Second, he raises a factual concern regarding whether reported historical
events actually happened; this is the empiricist epistemological objection
 Lessing,

;  (italics mine).
; –.
 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, rd edn, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, ), –, and .
 Lessing, ; .
 Ibid.,



which imposes an exceptionally high epistemic standard for justification
of such knowledge claims. This is Lessing’s temporal gap.

The metaphysical gap
The temporal gap is initially presented by Lessing to be the chief issue.
But as many scholars have observed, Lessing shifts abruptly from the
problem of temporal distance to that of relating historical truths to metaphysical/religious truths, invoking a ‘metaphysical gap’, signaled by his
famous declaration that the ‘accidental truths of history can never become
the proof of necessary truths of reason’. Lessing introduces the modal
categories of contingency and necessity, and with this shift he effectively
points up the distinction between historical statements about what happened (which he now grants for the sake of argument) and conclusions
of religious truth derived from them, which on his view will be necessary
truths: he asks, ‘If on historical grounds I have no objection to the statement that this Christ himself rose from the dead, must I therefore accept
it as true that this risen Christ was the Son of God?’ More directly, ‘What
is the connection between my inability to raise any significant objection to
the evidence of the former and my obligation to believe something against
which my reason rebels?’
Lessing’s point is that there is no connection, for these are two separate
classes of truths, which cannot entail one another:
But to jump with that historical truth [Christ’s resurrection] to
a quite different class of truths, and to demand of me that I
 C.

Stephen Evans noted these first two ditches, which he dubbed the epistemological and metaphysical ditches, in Kierkegaard’s ‘Fragments’ and ‘Postscript’: The Religious
Philosophy of Johannes Climacus (Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, ), f.
Cf. also Campbell, ‘Lessing’s problem’, f., as well as Chadwick’s introduction in the
Stanford edition of Lessing Theological Writings, f.
 Michalson, Lessing’s ‘Ugly Ditch’, , –.
 Lessing, ;  (italics in original).
 Ibid., ; .
 Ibid.



should form all my metaphysical and moral ideas accordingly ;
to expect me to alter all my fundamental ideas of the nature
of the Godhead because I cannot set any credible testimony
against the resurrection of Christ: if that is not a µταβασ ις
ις αλλo γνoς, then I do not know what Aristotle meant by
this phrase.
Thus he articulates the metaphysical gap between accidental, contingent,
a posteriori truths on the one hand, and necessary, a priori truths on the
other. Lurking in the background here is Lessing’s dependence on Leibniz’s theory of knowledge, which maintains that truths of reason are discoverable by reason and thus ipso facto necessary, whereas contingent
truths are learned through the senses. Leibniz writes in the Monadology, ‘There are also two kinds of truths—those of reasoning and those of
fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is quite impossible; those of fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible’. This
epistemology then presupposes two features: first, the distinction can be
understood in terms of how we acquire such knowledge, and second, the
two truths can be cast in terms of their modal status, i.e. contingent or necessary. This might be called the modal aspect of the metaphysical ditch,
namely, the contingent–necessary distinction, which surfaces quite clearly
in Lessing’s language.
Yet it is important to notice the multifaceted nature of the problem
which the metaphysical ditch represents, namely, that there are two further aspects besides the modal aspect. Just as Leibniz’s theory of knowledge posed the distinction in terms of how truths are known (a priori or
a posteriori), there is the related concern regarding whether contingent
events in history can be viewed as revelatory of religious truth, since the
 Ibid.,

; .
Chadwick’s introduction in the Stanford edition, .
 Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology, §; cited from Benjamin Rand (ed.) Modern Classical Philosophers, nd edn (Cambridge MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, ), 
(italics in original).
 These three aspects are delineated in Michalson Lessing’s ‘Ugly Ditch’, –; the
labels, however, are mine.
 See



underlying Enlightenment premise holds that religious truths are known
by reason and thus are necessary. Enlightenment thinkers were uneasy
with the notion of ‘historical revelation’, since for them it combined opposed concepts: that which is historical is by its nature unique and particular, occurring at a certain time and place; whereas religious truths,
being universal in scope and domain, must be universally accessible, and
since only necessary truths are universally accessible to rational reason,
religious truths must also be necessary. Let us call this second aspect
the rationalist aspect of the metaphysical ditch.
Finally, there is still a third aspect of the metaphysical ditch which
seems identical to the modal aspect yet notes the theological manoeuvre
involved in the transition from historical truths to Christological claims.
Such transitions seem to land one halfway between contingent truths and
necessary truths, since Christological claims ‘are not necessary truths’ in
the Leibnizian sense, yet they are ‘radically different from normal historical assertions’. Lessing’s difficulty here may come from his equation
of all religious (and thus theological) truths with necessary truths, but it
seems appropriate to distinguish them in a way Lessing does not. Let us
term this the dogmatic aspect of the metaphysical ditch.

The existential gap
The third ditch is the existential ditch, which involves the ‘problem of
religious appropriation’. This ditch concerns the ‘conditions necessary for
an individual’s successfully apprehending, accepting, and perhaps even
understanding the religious message’, which may seem ‘dubious, strange,
or fantastic’. Also important to the existential ditch as Lessing presents
 One

way to relate these two dichotomous truths of history and religion was to claim
that revelation is expressive of universal, necessary truths, but is not constitutive of them;
Lessing conveys this in § of ‘The education of the human race’, when he writes that
‘revelation gives nothing to the human race which human reason could not arrive at on
its own; only it has given, and still gives to it, the most important of these things sooner’;
Lessing, ; .
 See Michalson, Lessing’s ‘Ugly Ditch’, .
 Ibid., , .



it is his use of the image of ‘binding’, foreshadowing the Enlightenment
concern of autonomy. Notice Lessing’s unease in this regard:
But since the truth of these miracles has completely ceased to
be demonstrable by miracles still happening now, since they
are no more than reports of miracles (even though they be narratives which have not been, and cannot be, impugned), I deny
that they can and should bind me to the very least faith in the
other teachings of Christ. What then does bind me? Nothing
but these teachings themselves.
Here Lessing exploits the problem of temporal distance to highlight
the issue of the place of authority, and particularly, where authority
may be said to reside. Though Lessing himself does not fill this in,
he directs us toward the answer which the Enlightenment bequeathed
to us, wherein the individual self gains unprecedented import as the
‘criterion for what can be considered truly revelatory’. If the temporal
gap can be (crudely) summarized as questioning the ‘what’ and ‘when’ of
historical revelation, and the metaphysical gap as questioning the ‘how’
of relating the historical to the religious, then this final existential gap
can be represented as questioning the ‘why’: Why should I accept and
appropriate this strange religious message? Why should I consider it to be
binding upon me? Clearly, this gap embodies the most personal element
and is related to one’s reasons for feeling the desire or need to choose this
personal appropriation.
 See

ibid., , . I am well aware that Kant coined the term ‘autonomous’, but it
seems plausible that this was a concept Lessing understood, especially since they were
writing in Germany during the same period (s–s). On the history of moral and
political philosophy relating to Kant and the notion of autonomy, see J. B. Schneewind,
The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), esp. part
. Perhaps surprisingly, Lessing is not mentioned in this massive book, save in a single
footnote ().
 Lessing, ; .
 Michalson, Lessing’s ‘Ugly Ditch’, . Michalson considers Lessing representative of
‘a stage in this development of a new view of the religious self ... because of his appeal to
the inner truth of authentic religion’; this ‘signals the modern turn “inward’ ” ().



The triadic structure of the gaps
Let me sum up and arrange the framework of the three ditches and the
metaphysical ditch’s three aspects to offer some clarity. I propose that
we view these three ditches in a kind of succession, with the three aspects
of the metaphysical ditch arranged such that the rationalist and dogmatic
aspects form a point of overlap or contact between the ditches:
Temporal

Metaphysical
rationalist

modal

Existential
dogmatic

These contact points serve as ‘transitional’ stages or intermediary points
which highlight the shared concerns of each ditch. The rationalist aspect
involves the uneasy conjunction of the particularity of contingent, historical truth as revelation with seemingly universal, necessary, religious
truth, and is thus related on the one side to the temporal ditch’s problem
of historical particularity, and on the other, to the metaphysical ditch’s
modal aspect in its embrace of the applicability of necessary truths. Similarly, the dogmatic aspect stems from the difficulty of existentially appropriating heteronomous theological dogmas, which seem contrary to the
definition of natural religion’s necessary truths; it is related both to the
necessary truths of the modal aspect on the one side, as well as the existential ditch’s problem of the autonomous self’s appropriation of a heteronomous message. This structure demonstrates the (literal) centrality
 In

what follows I expand upon Michalson’s formulation in my development of the
aspects of overlap and transition; Michalson has expressed his approbation of this approach in personal correspondence.
 Kierkegaard readers should notice the resemblance between this triadic structure
and Kierkegaard’s three ‘stages’ or ‘spheres’ of existence, developed in Either/Or and
Stages on Life’s Way:
Aesthetic

Ethical
irony

Religious
humour

This structural similarity, though remarkable, seems coincidental, and at any rate is not
the focus of this paper.



of the contingent–necessary distinction for Lessing, and hence it becomes
apparent how much of the structure hinges on it; thus his infamous ditch
is mainly a ‘modal gap’.
The remainder of this essay will focus on Kierkegaard’s response to
Lessing’s ditches in the writings of his pseudonym Climacus. I suggest
that the triadic organizational structure of Kierkegaard’s response signals
his awareness of the threefold nature of the problem; especially relevant
will be the extent to which Kierkegaard’s own emphases are detectable
within this organization, by which he seeks to reframe and adjust the
problems.

Climacus’s response to Lessing
In the foregoing I have referred to both Kierkegaard and Climacus, but in
what follows I will refer only to Climacus, heeding Kierkegaard’s request
in the Postscript’s ‘first and last explanation’: ‘Therefore, if it should occur
to anyone to want to quote a particular passage from the books, it is my
wish, my prayer, that he will do me the kindness of citing the respective
pseudonymous author’s name, not mine’. This will mitigate the difficulties present in interpreting Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous work in our current context. The case can be made that Climacus speaks for Kierkegaard
in these works, but I will not take a stand on this issue here.
First off, it must be recognized that Fragments and Postscript are organized into sections which seem to deal mainly with each of Lessing’s
three ditches. Climacus divides the problem of the truth of Christianity into objective and subjective problems, as is clear from the division in
the Postscript between parts  and , on the objective issue and subjective issue, respectively. Under the objective problem, he further distin Kierkegaard,

Postscript, [].
For example, see Patrick Gardiner, Kierkegaard: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, ), ; and Niels Thulstrup, Commentary on Kierkegaard’s
Concluding Unscientific Postscript with a New Introduction, Robert J. Widenmann (tr.)
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, ), –.
 The full titles of these parts are ‘Part one: The objective issue of the truth of Chris



guishes between historical and philosophical truth: ‘objectively understood,
truth can signify: () historical truth, () philosophical truth’. Thus with
parts  and , and the further divisions within the objective problem of
part , we already have the makings of the triadic structure of Climacus’s organization. Fragments, in introducing the question as a highly abstract ‘thought-project’, primarily considers the objective–historical problem; the first part of Postscript treats the objective–philosophical problem;
and the second (and largest) part of the Postscript deals with the subjective
problem.
Yet even this is too simplistic, since Fragments does treat the philosophical problem, just as the first part of Postscript considers issues of temporal
distance. Still, one can roughly characterize Climacus’s acknowledgement
of Lessing’s ditches in the following way:
Temporal
↓

Metaphysical
↓
(objective)

Existential
↓
(subjective)

historical

philosophical

Fragments

Postscript, pt 

subjectivity/religious
appropriation
Postscript, pt 

Climacus’s organization seems to identify, if only implicitly, the challenge
Lessing has presented. However, Climacus’s actual placement of section 
on Lessing in Postscript under ‘Part —The Subjective Issue’ would seem
to belie the above categorization: it might be better placed under part ’s
objective issue, since Climacus is there still dealing with Lessing’s temporal and metaphysical problems, both of which are ‘objective’ by his own
demarcation. Yet it will become clear that this is indicative of Climatianity’ (Postscript, ), and ‘Part two: The subjective issue, the subjective individual’s
relation to the truth of Christianity, or becoming a Christian’ (Postscript, ).
 Kierkegaard, Postscript, .
 On this, see Michalson, Lessing’s ‘Ugly Ditch’, .
 Moreover, it is probable that Climacus has in mind Grundtvig, rather than Lessing, as
the primary concern of part one; this would also help account for Climacus’s placement
of section  on Lessing outside of part one (thanks to an anonymous referee here).



cus’s overall approach to subsume the objective problem into the subjective problem, and thus, in view of his strategy, it may yet be appropriate
as it is.
It will also become clear that although Climacus adopts Lessing’s triadic structure, he disagrees sharply with Lessing over where the primary
emphasis in the structure should be placed. While he agrees with Lessing about historical certainty and the incommensurability between contingency and necessity, Climacus thinks that too much weight given to
objective problems detracts from the essence of what it is to be (and become) a Christian subjectively. In this way Lessing becomes a respected
dialogue-partner, yet also a disoriented thinker who provides an illustration, and signpost, for the path one should not take in contrast to the route
Climacus wants to travel.
An apt starting point for noticing these differences is to consider the
significant questions on Climacus’s title page to Fragments: ‘Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal consciousness; how can such
a point of departure be of more than historical interest; can an eternal
happiness be built on historical knowledge?’ These signal Climacus’s
intention to address Lessing’s problems, insofar as they seem to parallel
Lessing’s well-known distinction, adverted to earlier, between the ‘accidental truths of history’ and the ‘necessary truths of reason’. But notice
the change Climacus has made in the wording: ‘eternal’ has been substituted for ‘necessary’. This modification is highly significant, since it
represents Climacus’s way of seeing the problems differently from Lessing, and locates the fundamental disagreement between them. By moving from ‘necessary’ to ‘eternal’, Climacus abandons the modal distinction
which Lessing viewed to be so relevant, and effectively shifts the ground
on which the argument plays out, moving away from the very point on
 It

is important to distinguish between the fact that Kierkegaard respects and follows
Lessing on other issues, and yet largely disagrees with him regarding the issues presented
here. Kierkegaard clearly considers Lessing to have great insight in other areas (e.g. on
indirect communication), and seeks to emulate and ally himself with Lessing. For more,
see Hannay, ‘Having Lessing on one’s side’, passim.
 Kierkegaard, Fragments, (title page).



which Lessing’s view turns. This shift should be borne in mind as we
proceed through Climacus’s own thoughts on each of the three ditches.

Contemporaneity and the temporal gap
Climacus’s ‘thought-project’ in Fragments is to consider the question of
how the truth can be learned. He puts forth the Socratic picture which
posits that truth is intrinsic to and resides within the learner, and the
teacher merely helps the student in recollection. But Climacus wants to go
beyond Socrates, and develops an alternative model: the truth comes from
a transcendent God, who gives to the finite human learner God’s incarnated self from whom to learn, as well as the condition requisite for comprehending this truth. Thus Climacus writes, ‘if the learner is to obtain
the truth, the teacher must bring it to him, but not only that. Along with
it, he must provide him with the condition for understanding it’. In this
sense, the God of which Climacus writes is both ‘teacher and saviour’.
The two sticking points for Lessing in this regard would be that God
becomes incarnate in time (historical-temporal problem), and that God becomes incarnate in time (metaphysical problem). Climacus handles the
first, and in particular Lessing’s concern of temporal distance, by considering the issue of contemporaneity. Climacus, as Lessing, speaks
of the difference between the contemporary to the teacher and the noncontemporary, or ‘the follower at second hand’. Recall that this was Lessing’s first objection, namely, the empiricist complaint that being temporally removed from some important historical claim of supernatural acts
 For

more on Climacus’s readjustment of the problems Lessing posed, see Jan-Olav
Henriksen, The Reconstruction of Religion, –.
 Kierkegaard, Fragments, .
 Ibid., .
 Ibid., –.
 It is worth noting that Kierkegaard cites or develops the concept of contemporaneity
in several other works, most prominently in Practice in Christianity, Howard V. Hong and
Edna H. Hong (eds) (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, ), esp. –, –,
and –, and in The Book on Adler, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds) (Princeton
NJ: Princeton University Press, ), esp. –, –, and Supplement, –.



means that such a ‘fact’ cannot be verified, and one must be content to rely
upon ‘reports’ of supernatural phenomena. Climacus essentially agrees
with Lessing regarding this view of history:
If that fact is regarded as a simple historical fact, then being
contemporary counts for something, and it is an advantage to
be contemporary, or to be as close as possible, or to be able
to assure oneself of the reliability of the contemporaries, etc.
Every historical fact is only a relative fact, and therefore it is
entirely appropriate for the relative power, time, to decide the
relative fates of people with respect to contemporaneity.
In Postscript, Climacus again claims that ‘with regard to the historical the
greatest certainty is only an approximation’, and that even ‘if all the angels
united, they would still be able to produce only an approximation, because
in historical knowledge an approximation is the only certainty’.
But Climacus is approaching the issue differently: whereas for Lessing, historical claims of supernatural-religious significance require more
certainty, which cannot be attained, Climacus thinks there is an ‘essential
misrelation’ between approximations of mere historical knowledge ‘and a
personal, infinite interestedness in one’s own eternal happiness’, such
that it is no longer a question of mere historical judgement. Rather, with
faith there is a passionate, infinite interest, and so, in contrast to Lessing,
Climacus insists that historical ‘certainty and passion do not hitch up as a
team’.
Thus, Climacus has already distinguished his approach from Lessing’s
in two ways. First, he emphasizes that there is a condition given by the
incarnate God which creates in the learner the possibility of understanding the historical event, regardless of temporal location. The role of the
reception of this condition from God can be seen in the following passage:
 Kierkegaard,

Fragments, .
Postscript, ,  (italics in original).
 Ibid., .
 Ibid., .

 Idem,



Just as the historical becomes the occasion for the contemporary to become a follower— by receiving the condition, please
note, from the god himself ... —so the report of the contemporaries becomes the occasion for everyone coming later to become a follower—by receiving the condition, please note, from
the god himself.
In this sense, the contemporary eyewitness is no better off than the person
at second hand, because either one must receive the condition of understanding in order to become a follower of the teacher. Climacus notes that
‘it is easy for the contemporary learner to become a historical eyewitness,
but the trouble is that knowing a historical fact ... by no means makes the
eyewitness a follower, which is understandable, because such knowledge
means nothing more to him than the historical’. The follower is characterized not by her visual ability to see and observe the teacher at first hand,
but by seeing with the ‘eyes of faith’: the follower as believer ‘is a contemporary in the autopsy of faith. But in this autopsy, every non-contemporary
(in the sense of immediacy) is in turn a contemporary’. ‘Autopsy’ in this
literal, etymological sense is the personal act of seeing, which is part
of the faith given in the condition. Hence there ‘is no follower at second
hand’, for the ‘first and last generation are essentially alike’ in that they
both require reception of the condition: God ‘gave the follower the condition to see it and opened for him the eyes of faith’.
Second, Climacus emphasizes that, since everything hinges on this
given condition, critical enquiry into the historical facts takes on only
secondary importance; this is the essential misrelation between faith and
(historical) certainty. One does not believe on the basis of any reliability,
but on the basis of the condition:
 Idem,

Fragments, .
.
 Ibid., , .
 See ibid., , n. .
 Ibid., –. Cf. also Postscript, .
 Kierkegaard, Fragments, .

 Ibid.,



Only the person who personally receives the condition from
the god, ... only that person believes. If he believes (that is, fancies that he believes) because many good, honest people here
on the hill have believed ... then he is a fool ... . If the trustworthiness of the contemporary is to have any interest for him, ...
his interest must be in regard to something historical. ... If the
fact of which we speak were a simple historical fact, the historiographer’s scrupulous accuracy would be of great importance.
This is not the case here, for faith cannot be distilled from even
the finest detail.
For Climacus, faith has no direct need for critical reconstruction of historical facts, for this faith simply posits that God became human in time,
which historical study cannot itself verify anyway; it is ‘here that the historical in the more concrete sense is inconsequential’. Against Lessing,
Climacus affirms that ‘faith is not a knowledge’, but the ‘follower, however, is in faith related to that teacher in such a way that he is eternally
occupied with his historical existence’. This mention of the eternal leads
us into the next section.

Eternity and the metaphysical gap
So much for the temporal gap. Climacus’s reconfiguration of the issues
places faith at the centre, which brings all followers into contemporaneity with Christ, and this faith conceives the infinite interest in the eternal truth on which eternal happiness is built. Yet this eternal truth occurs within time; so Climacus must deal with Lessing’s invocation of
the contingent–necessary distinction which disjunctively relates historical
events and religious truth.
As Michalson points out, Lessing’s rationalist view of religion dictates
that historical events, if they have religious significance, have such sig Ibid.,
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nificance due not to their character of theological eventfulness, but as
expressive of the deeper, necessary religious truths to which they point:
history acts as the ‘primer’ or ‘clothing and style’ of abstract necessary
truths previously unknown. Climacus, perhaps in playful allusion to
this picture of history as attire, cites his project in the Postscript as addressing the question of Christianity by clothing it ‘in historical costume’.
(Note that Kierkegaard, in a draft of the final paragraph of Fragments,
writes that he intends in the Postscript ‘to name the child by its right
name and give the question its historical costume’. ) Here it is evident
that the temporal-historical issue is not one of mere distance (although
this was present in Fragments), but for Climacus it serves to ground the
metaphysical-religious claim of eternal happiness.
Climacus does not dispute Lessing’s identification of historical moments as accidental, contingent events. Instead, Climacus embraces the
contingency of history as a step in his overall response to Lessing, since
for Climacus history is not decisively inferior to the truth which faith sees;
indeed, history is the vehicle by which theological truth is communicated.
In the Interlude in Fragments, Climacus takes up these questions of contingency and historical events as ‘coming into existence’.
It is important to see the Interlude as representing the temporal distance to which Lessing pointed: in the structure of Fragments, it separates
‘the situation of the contemporary follower’ (Chapter ), from ‘the follower at second hand’ (Chapter ), and thus it symbolizes the , years
between the contemporary disciple of Christ and Climacus’s reader. As
it relates to our purposes, the thrust of the Interlude is to consider the
metaphysical distinction between necessity and contingency, which forms
the backbone of Lessing’s objection. Climacus points out that the char Michalson,
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acter of the historical is contingency: the crucial historical predicate is
that it has ‘come into existence’. And since ‘the change of coming into
existence is the transition from possibility to actuality’, then these are
the only appropriate modal categories to apply to the historical. In other
words, Climacus is implying that necessity is inherently unfit as regards
the historical. Necessity as Lessing invokes it smacks of the ‘epistemological certainty’ of logic, but ‘the world of logic leaves everything as it
is; authentic “change” occurs only in the historical realm’. Coming into
existence cannot involve necessity but only possibility, and as such the
possibilities involve freedom.
Now what can all this mean? It would seem that Climacus, in suggesting a deep incommensurability between contingency and necessity
has given the game to Lessing. But not quite yet. Although Climacus is
conceding the uncertainty that results from a ‘permanent corrigibility’
of historical knowledge, he is also gaining a leg-up on Lessing: it enables
Climacus to introduce the category of ‘belief’. Belief, says Climacus, is ‘the
organ for the historical’, which ‘must have within itself the corresponding
something by which in its certitude it continually annuls the incertitude
that corresponds to the uncertainty of coming into existence ... . This
precisely is the nature of belief ... belief believes what it does not see’.
Climacus maintains that ‘belief is not a knowledge but an act of freedom,
an expression of the will’: ‘It believes the “thus and so” of that which has
come into existence and has annulled in itself the possible “how” of that
which has come into existence’. The believer accepts the ‘what’ of the
theologically-laden historical event, without doubting its ‘how’.
Robert C. Roberts, Faith, Reason, and History: Rethinking Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, ), –, –.
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On Climacus’s view, belief collaborates with faith, and it is here that
the seeds of an answer to the metaphysical ditch are to be found. For
Climacus, it will not do to treat the issue as an objective problem of reconciling two separate genres of contingency and necessity as categories
of truth-knowledge; this is to dwell too heavily on the modal aspect of
the metaphysical gap, and it does not permit the most important category
of knowledge, namely, the truth which resonates with one inwardly and
subjectively, on which eternal happiness is built. We need not locate necessity in the historical, as Hegel would have it, but can instead insist that
‘a human being is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal’, since we
are infinitely, passionately interested in our personal eternal happiness.
Incredibly, in the Incarnation ‘the paradox specifically unites the contradictories, [and] is the eternalizing of the historical and the historicizing of
the eternal’, but a preoccupation with the objective how-it-can-be-so is
to miss the point:
The trouble ... is that in its paradoxical form the truth of Christianity has something in common with the nettle: the solid,
sensible subject only stings himself when he wants to grasp it
summarily in this way, or rather ... he does not grasp it at all; he
grasps its objective truth so objectively that he himself remains
outside.
Climacus also employs an apt metaphor of sawing wood to illustrate
the speculative philosophical thinker’s tendency toward the objective answers:
In sawing wood, one should not press down too hard on the
saw; the lighter the touch of the sawer, the better the saw functions. If one presses down on the saw with all one’s might,
one will never manage to saw at all. Similarly, the speculative thinker should make himself objectively light, but whoever
 Kierkegaard,
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is impassionedly, infinitely interested in his eternal happiness
makes himself as subjectively heavy as possible.
Thus, Climacus rejects Lessing’s appeal to objective verifiability and
philosophical necessity: he denies Lessing’s identification of religious
truth with the necessary truths of reason, and he considers Lessing’s approach too objective in that it seeks a proof or demonstration before the
assent of belief or faith. Climacus acknowledges with Lessing that such
demonstrations are not forthcoming, but denies their relevance for the
individual’s faith, replacing objective concerns of necessity with subjective concerns of eternity. One might say that while Lessing focuses on the
modal aspect of the metaphysical gap, Climacus’s strategy is to see the
problem as more of a piece with the dogmatic aspect, which in turn is
quite related to the existential gap itself, where Climacus’s true focus lies.

Subjectivity and the existential gap
For Climacus, the existential gap represents that which is most crucial
about a religion whose theology is nonetheless based on a transcendent
God revealed through historical events and attested to by historical documents. We have seen that Climacus embraces ‘a particular historical
moment—the incarnation—as theologically determinative’, yet ‘draws on
the unique character of faith’s object as a way of neutralizing the effects of
temporal distance... simultaneously demonstrating the indispensability of
a historical moment for faith and the irrelevance of empirical enquiry into
that historical moment’. He can make such moves because of the momentous weight he gives to the subjective role of religious appropriation.
The role of the chapter on possible/actual theses by Lessing in part 
of the Postscript seems to be to introduce the relevance of the subjectively
 Ibid., . Similarly: ‘If Christianity is essentially something objective, it behooves
the observer to be objective. But if Christianity is essentially subjectivity, it is a mistake
if the observer is objective’ (ibid., ).
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existing thinker and the duplexity of its corresponding notions of thoughtexistence and the double-reflection of communication. It is here that Climacus begins his long deliberation on the theme that ‘truth is inwardness; objectively there is no truth, but the appropriation is the truth’.
This appropriation hinges on the subject’s decision, which for Climacus
becomes the paradigmatic language of crossing the existential ditch. As
Climacus puts it, ‘when the issue becomes objective, there is no question
of eternal happiness, because this lies precisely in subjectivity and in decision’. This decision Climacus sometimes calls the ‘moment’, the point at
which the individual subjectively appropriates the paradoxical religious
message.
For Lessing, this problem of decision for faith surfaced as the religious
appropriation of a modal distinction he could not swallow. Above all,
Lessing seemed to want the religion to sit well with his intellect, which
is why he focused on the objective issues. Climacus acknowledges with
sympathy such a desire, and accounts for it when he portrays faith as the
‘happy passion’ which ‘occurs when the understanding and the paradox
happily encounter each other in the moment, when understanding steps
aside and the paradox gives itself’. This then was Lessing’s problem: he
could not let his understanding step aside. And though Lessing stated he
could not accept that against which his reason rebels, Climacus also understands this, and integrates it into the entire process: the offence of reason, which is the ‘unhappy relation’ to the paradox, must be embraced
rather than rejected. The paradox ‘requires faith against the understanding’, for ‘the narrow gate to the hard way of faith is offence’.
 Kierkegaard,
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In one sense, Climacus brings us back full-circle to the contemporaneity solution when he relates one’s own decision for faith, and the transition
into it, to one’s becoming contemporary to ‘Christianity’s entry into the
world’: it requires ‘the most terrible of all decisions in a person’s life’, and
this ‘corresponds to the transitional situation contemporary with Christianity coming into the world’. This decision is ‘ most terrible ’ due to
its intensely personal nature as subjective and existential, and because the
stakes are those of eternal happiness. While the objective problem centres
on historical approximation and philosophical deliberation, the subjective issue requires appropriation: ‘The decision rests in the subject: the
appropriation is the paradoxical inwardness that is specifically different
from all other inwardness. Being a Christian is not defined by the “what”
of Christianity but by the “how” of the Christian. This “how” can only
fit one thing, the absolute paradox.’ Note here the important distinction between the ‘what’ of Christianity and the ‘how’ of the Christian; this
highlights Climacus’s concern for the subjective individual’s relation to,
in, and with the Christian faith.
But the existential gap was also posited as a hiatus created by the ‘why’
question, in particular, why such a religious message would be binding
upon the individual. As far as I can tell, Climacus does not directly take
up this concern. But perhaps Climacus’s subjective answer follows from
the ways in which he has already dealt with the temporal and metaphysical gaps: he has made room for the decisive historical revelation of the
transcendent God’s incarnation and teaching. If this is accepted, it may be
of little dispute that such revelation is authoritative for the individual, to
whom God calls for appropriation in the decision of faith.
This is not the place to explore in detail Climacus’s view of subjectivity, which would take us beyond the scope of this essay. It is sufficient
to observe that Climacus, though aware of the several problems Lessing
 Postscript,
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raises, approaches the issue not as Lessing conveys the ditch(es), as
being one great divide, or even as three successive ditches one must
traverse in turn. Rather, Climacus’s solution indicates that in crossing the
most important existential ditch, one leaps over them all: on the spatial
metaphor of the ditch, one could say that Climacus sees the gaps more as
vertically stratified, and recognizes that clearing one particular gap (the
existential ditch) actually gets one to where one wants to be.

This diagram identifies, in a rough way, the ‘ground’ on opposite ends
of each ditch, that is, where Lessing begins the problems, and where, as
we have seen, Climacus suggests the answers reside. If our initial depiction of Lessing’s ditches had them side by side, with points of overlap and
transition, this diagram represents Climacus’s reformulation which gives
primacy to the existential ditch, yet sees them all as integrally related.
Here, leaping the existential ditch obviates the other two gaps without
thereby avoiding them; for on Climacus’s view it is not enough to cross
merely the existential ditch, though in doing so one does cross the others.
This diagram also portrays how Climacus’s answers all comprise subjective responses, even to the ‘objective’ problems, which are rooted in the
condition of faith, and which would seem to be the best answers one can
give on a matter of this kind.



Conclusion
We have seen the multifaceted nature of the problem Lessing presents, including the distinct objections of the temporal, metaphysical, and existential gaps. I have tried to show that Climacus’s organization and structure
of Fragments and Postscript lends plausibility to the thesis that Climacus is
responding to these gaps in kind, though he divides the problem broadly
into objective and subjective sides. Climacus diverges from Lessing in his
treatment of the modal aspect of the metaphysical ditch, and thus it can
be seen to form the heart of the issue. The modal gap consists, on the one
hand, in Lessing’s emphasis upon the contingent–necessary distinction as
it relates to historical vs religious truths, and on the other Climacus’s
refusal of these terms as an adequate depiction of Christian theological
truths. Climacus maintains that Christian theology is properly grounded
in contingent history, which for him demonstrates the sovereignty of a
transcendent God who in grace opts for human incarnation as a means of
sending the teacher for humankind to learn from (epistemological), and
which also provides the condition of faith for understanding (ontological).
It is precisely because Christian theology is brought home (contemporaneous with Christ via the ‘autopsy’ of faith) to the individual in existential
appropriation (and not through assent to objective truths) that the subjective answer is Climacus’s response to Lessing. In providing this subjective
alternative, Climacus implies that Lessing’s orientation is misguided, and
that Lessing’s undue preoccupation with the objective issues of historical
and philosophical truths is what gets him into his worrisome position.
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